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SURVEY SECTION
Remedies. DiPardo & Sons, Inc. v. Lauzon, 708 A.2d 165 (R.I.
1998). An action for tortious interference with contractual rela-
tions brings with it a right to a jury trial under the Rhode Island
Constitution, even where the complaint requests substantial equi-
table relief.
In DiPardo & Sons, Inc. v. Lauzon,1 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether, under Rhode Island
law, tortious interference of contract was an equitable or legal
claim, and, whether a party to such a claim has the right to a jury
trial. The court determined that tortious interference with con-
tract was a legal claim, and, as such, a party to a cause of action
involving this claim has the right to a trial by jury under Rhode
Island law.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The DiPardo family funeral business, established in 1928 by
Egidio DiPardo, was for many years one of the most successful fu-
neral homes in Woonsocket.3 The business thrived for two genera-
tions, but then suffered a relentless attack at the hands of Egidio's
double-dealing grandson, James DiPardo (James).4
James apprenticed under his father Angelo and became a li-
censed embalmer and funeral director in the 1970s, working in the
family business along with his father. A "bitter row" with his fa-
ther, however, caused James to quit the family business and pur-
sue other interests.5 James then returned after Angelo died, and
acquired 49 percent of the corporate stock in DiPardo & Sons from
his mother, Elaine.6
1. 708 A.2d 165 (R.I. 1998).
2, See id. at 173.
3. See id. at 167.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See id. The nature of this acquisition was itself in serious contention, with
James insisting the stock was a gift to him in grateful appreciation of his years of
underpaid service, and Elaine contending that the stock transfer was pursuant to
James' agreement to pay $58,000 in the future. In any event, no payments on the
note were ever made by James, and Elaine's claim later became part of the litiga-
tion of the case. See id. The issue was decided against James at trial with the
trial justice finding "overwhelming evidence ... that it was not a gift of stock for
past or future services . . . ." Id. at 176.
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Relations between James and Elaine deteriorated, and in
early 1993 they had a disagreement over whether James should
buy out his mother's interest in the family business entirely and
obtain sole ownership in the corporation. 7 According to Elaine's
trial testimony, James uttered death threats to her and threatened
to destroy the name of the DiPardo funeral business.8 During the
week of February 6, 1993, James began taking steps to undermine
his mother's apparent intention to maintain administrative control
over DiPardo & Sons. He paid all the corporation's outstanding
mortgage and other debts, dismissed its employees, and "filched"
its client lists and other business documents.9
James then posted a "Closed" sign in the window of the funeral
home (notwithstanding that the funeral home still had some 300
"pre-arranged-funeral contracts" in its inventory),10 and negoti-
ated with Lauzon, a principal of another Woonsocket funeral home,
to form a competing funeral business, Lauzon & DiPardo Funeral
Home, L.L.C. (Lauzon & DiPardo). 11 Opening the doors of the new
funeral home just doors down the street from DiPardo & Sons,
James and Lauzon advertised on local radio stations that Lauzon
& DiPardo's "new location" was just down the street.' 2 These con-
fusing advertisements, issued four times daily, implied that the
original firm, DiPardo & Sons, had simply changed its name and
moved. 13
The still-existent firm of DiPardo & Sons suffered further at-
tacks when James and Lauzon communicated with a large number
of its former customers with the intention of wooing them to the
new funeral home. 14 James and Lauzon also sent form letters to
DiPardo & Sons customers, whose names were drawn from the
lists that James had filched from DiPardo & Sons, 15 designed to
encourage clients to transfer their contracts to the newly formed
funeral home.' 6 Lauzon personally ferried some of the clients to
7. Id.
8. Id. at 167 n.1.
9. Id. at 167.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 168.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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the DiPardo & Sons premises to facilitate these transfers of con-
tracts.17 In addition, Lauzon and James filed "specious" com-
plaints with various state regulatory agencies against DiPardo &
Sons.' 8
The effect of this "cutthroat onslaught" on DiPardo & Sons was
to cause it severe financial losses.19 Upon learning of James' at-
tack upon the family business, Elaine, owner of the controlling in-
terest in DiPardo & Sons, filed suit on behalf of the corporation in
superior court on April 1, 1993 seeking both money damages and
an order enjoining James and the Lauzon defendants 20 from con-
tinuing in their course of conduct. 2' The court issued a temporary
restraining order 22 and then, after a hearing on April 16, 1993, is-
sued a preliminary injunction restraining James and the Lauzon
defendants from affirmatively soliciting any customers of DiPardo
& Sons, and even from using the DiPardo name.23
The complaint against James and the Lauzon defendants con-
tained three counts and numerous specific allegations, some of
which were equitable and some of which were legal in nature.24
The defendants filed timely demands for a jury trial, but by the
time of trial, only one count-an allegation that Lauzon had tor-
tiously interfered with the present and prospective contractual re-
lations of DiPardo & Sons, Inc.-involved an issue for which a jury
trial was demanded.25
The trial judge concluded that the case was predominately eq-
uitable in nature,26 and ruled that the count of tortious interfer-
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. The evidence presented at trial established that DiPardo & Sons suffered
a "grave loss of business" following James' conduct. Id. at 175.
20. See id. The Lauzon defendants included Lauzon, Joseph Lauzon & Sons
Funeral Home, Inc. and the Lauzon & DiPardo Funeral Home, L.L.C. See id. at
168 n.2.
21. See id. at 168.
22. See id. The temporary restraining order enjoined James and the Lauzon
defendants from using the name DiPardo and from having any contact with indi-
viduals who had entered into pre-arranged funeral agreements with DiPardo &
Sons. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 169.
26. The trial judge concluded that
[tihe primary thrust and primary complaint seeks equitable relief... pri-
marily, injunction against the defendants from engaging in any further
19991
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ence with contract rights did not require a jury trial.27 Over the
protestations of the Lauzon defendants, the trial judge tried the
entire case without a jury. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the
trial justice entered judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of
$285,000 in compensatory damages along with interest and costs;
and $50,000 in punitive damages against each defendant.28 The
court also entered judgment in favor of DiPardo & Sons, Inc. for
the approximately $32,000 that James had diverted into an unau-
thorized unilateral pay raise for himself.29 The court also issued a
permanent injunction virtually identical in its terms to the prelim-
inary injunction issued before trial.30
ANALYsIs AND HoLDING
The Lauzon court was faced squarely with two important is-
sues of jury right jurisprudence: first, whether a claim of tortious
interference with contract rights brings with it a right to jury trial
at all, and second, whether, if the right to jury trial is applicable, a
jury trial must be had in a case arguably overshadowed by other,
equitable, issues.3 l
acts of oppression or misconduct against the plaintiffs' corporation includ-
ing but not limited to the use of the plaintiffs' corporate name, trade
name, and trade mark and from attacking and improperly soliciting plain-
tiffs' customers and customer list and enjoining the defendants from en-
gaging in unfair competition against the plaintiffs for the purpose of
misleading and confusing the public and for purposes of damaging or de-
stroying the plaintiffs' business.
Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. The order of punitive damages was vacated by the supreme court
pursuant to an agreement by all parties at a pre-briefing conference that the trial
justice erred in awarding punitive damages against James' estate because he had
died before trial. See id. at 176.
29. See id. James had died before the trial commenced and his estate was
substituted as a party defendant in his place. See id. at 169 n.4.
30. See id. at 169.
31. Justice Flanders, writing for the Rhode Island Supreme Court, framed the
issue as "whether the legislative policies, constitutional considerations, and tradi-
tional practices underlying the Sasso rule counsel its continued vitality in the con-
text of our modem rules of civil procedure." Id. at 170. The "Sasso rule" referred
to by Justice Flanders is that a Rhode Island court must "conduct a jury trial upon
a timely request with respect to any underlying legal issues in a civil action which
were traditionally cognizable at common law when money damages were sought
even when, as here, a complaint requests substantial equitable relief." Id. The
rule stems from Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sasso, 204 A.2d 821 (R.I. 1964), a decision
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The Jury Trial Right in Rhode Island
According to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, "a fundamental
doctrine of Rhode Island civil practice requires that claims histori-
cally cognizable at law should be tried by a jury."32 The tort of
interference with contract is relatively modern, at least in its cur-
rent form; Rhode Island first recognized the tort in 1934.3 3 Legal
commentators consulted by the Lauzon court tend to identify 1853
as the "first appearance of the tort in its contemporary visage."3
4
Yet this was a decade after the adoption of the Rhode Island Con-
stitution, so whether the right to jury applies was an issue requir-
ing some thoughtful consideration.3 5
In Lauzon, the Rhode Island Supreme Court went through a
historical tour of common law precedents in and out of Rhode Is-
land before and after the adoption of its 1843 constitution;36 more
than a dozen sources were cited, in all. The court even noted that
"incipient forms" of actions for tortious interference with contract
rights could be discerned from as far back as Roman law.37 The
court concluded that the modern tort of interference with contract
is roughly analogous to common law suits for intentionally calcu-
lating to "damage another in that other person's property or
trade."38
"The canvas of ancient authorities," wrote the Lauzon court,
"persuades us that Rhode Island's courts, if presented with a simi-
lar case in 1843, would have recognized ... that the allegations of
tortious and malicious interference with contract as pled in this
pre-dating the 1965 merger of Rhode Island's separate law and equity courts. See
id.
32. Id. at 169.
33. See id. at 172 (citing Local Dairymen's Coop. Assoc., Inc. v. Potvin, 173 A.
535, 536 (R.I. 1934)).
34. Id. at 173 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of
Torts § 129, at 980 (5th ed. 1984)).
35. See id. at 172. Strong implications that the tort of interference with con-
tract was thought of as triable in both law and equity courts at the time of the
tort's first appearance in Rhode Island can be identified in Local Dairymen's Coop-
erative Association, Inc. v. Potvin, 173 A. 535, 536 (R.I. 1934). See id. (stating that
"the Potvin decision also impliedly recognized that if damages were requested, the
same claim [of interference with contract] could be brought at law").
36. Id. at 172-75.
37. Id. at 174.
38. Id. at 173 (quoting Mogul S.S. Co. v. M'Gregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598,
613, A.C. 25 (Eng. C.A. 1889)).
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complaint stated an action on the case cognizable at law."39 Thus,
the protest of the defendants that the right to jury trial was im-
properly denied them was validated.40
The Mixed Law and Equity Issue
Lauzon, for the first time since the merger of law and equity in
1965, resolved the question whether in Rhode Island, a single
claim "at law" was enough to bring an otherwise heavily equitable
claim under the umbrella of the jury trial right. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sasso,4' had an-
swered this question in the affirmative before the merger. The
merger of law and equity was a significant alteration of Rhode Is-
land practice, however, and the outcome was in question.42 The
trial judge in Lauzon had dismissed Lauzon's demands for a jury
trial with the statement that the case was primarily equitable in
nature and that "the mere inclusion of a prayer for damages does
not convert it to an action in law."43
The supreme court dismissed this argument early on in its de-
cision, remarking that it had long been the law in Rhode Island
that mixed law and equity cases must defer to recognition of the
jury right.44 Although equity courts had historically had the power
to try any incidental legal issue without a jury,45 modern practice
requires that all such issues be brought before a jury upon request.
The Lauzon precedent closely corresponds to the federal prece-
dents of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 6 and Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood.47 Regardless whether a mixed law-and-equity case could
have been tried entirely in an equity court under the common law
of the early 1800s, such courts in Rhode Island must defer to the
"constitutionally influenced" policy that favors a jury trial of all
legal issues before moving on to equitable issue.48 The primary
39. Id. at 174.
40. See id. at 175.
41. 204 A.2d 821 (R.I. 1964).
42. See Lauzon, 708 A.2d at 175.
43. Id. at 169.
44. See id.
45. The trial justice determined that "a fair reading of the complaint... is a
prayer for equitable relief and that the mere inclusion of a prayer for damages does
not convert it to an action in law." Id.
46. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
47. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
48. Lauzon, 708 A.2d at 170.
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difference is that Rhode Island continues to adhere to a strict his-
torical analogy test for qualifying causes of action, rather than ac-
cept a remedy-sought test.
Thus, Lauzon extended the Sasso rule to post-merger Rhode
Island practice, applying the right to jury trial to the mixed claims
presented in the case "as if it had been brought in a pre-merger
court of law seeking money damages."49
CONCLUSION
In DiPardo & Sons, Inc. v. Lauzon, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court found that the 1965 merger of Rhode Island's separate
courts of law and equity did not alter the court's earlier jurispru-
dence with regard to the right to jury trial in civil suits. A jury
trial is required upon demand in suits for tortious interference
with contract, or other civil actions which by analogy were tradi-
tionally recognized at common law, even when a complaint re-
quests substantial equitable relief. Rhode Island continues to
follow the general path laid out at the national level by the United
States Supreme Court.
Roger I. Roots
49. Id. at 175.
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Remedies. Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305 (R.I. 1998). In a per-
sonal injury dispute where the plaintiff settles with one defendant
without giving a release, the later settling defendant ought to be
charged with interest at statutory rate on the total amount of dam-
ages. Interest should be calculated from the time the cause of ac-
tion arose until the date the first settlement payment is made.
Furthermore, the entire amount of damages should be reduced by
the total amount of the prior payment and the non-settling party
ought to be charged with interest on the reduced balance of the
remaining damages. Interest should accrue from the time of the
earlier payment until the date of final judgment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 31, 1991, Christopher Merrill (Merrill) and James
Pakuris (Pakuris) were traveling in a car driven by Edward Trenn
(Trenn) on Route 102 in North Kingstown.1 While speeding, Trenn
attempted to pass a school bus on the right.2 At the same time, the
school bus tried to merge into the right lane.3 The two vehicles
collided resulting in both Merrill and Pakuris sustaining substan-
tial injuries.4
On June 18, 1993, both Merrill and Pakuris filed suit in supe-
rior court against the driver of the car Trenn, the owner of the bus,
Arthur Bennett, the Town of North Kingstown, and the driver of
the bus, Betty Williams.6 In April of 1995, Trenn's automobile in-
surance settled with Merrill for $25,000, the extent of the policy.6
At the time of the settlement no mention was made as to whether
Merrill had released Trenn from all liability.7 Additionally, Mer-
rill did not release the other defendants from liability or include
language that would reduce his claim against them by more than
the $25,000 settlement payment.8
1. See Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305, 1305 (R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 1306.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. Furthermore, Rhode Island's version of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act states that:
[a] release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or
after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release
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After receiving the settlement payment from Trenn, Merrill
entered into non-binding arbitration with the remaining defend-
ants.9 The arbitrator assessed Merrill's total damages to be
$66,250.10 Additionally, the arbitrator concluded that the bus
driver was thirty-five percent at fault and Trenn was sixty-five per-
cent at fault.' Merrill elected to reject the arbitration award and
the case proceeded to a de novo trial in superior court.12 On April
12, 1996, prior to the commencement of trial, the parties reached
an agreement whereby the remaining defendants would pay Mer-
rill the balance of his total damages. 13 Additionally, both parties
agreed that Merrill was entitled to prejudgment interest, however,
neither party could agree upon how to factor in the $25,000 Trenn
settlement or the method to use to determine the interest.
14
Therefore, these two issues were submitted to the superior court
for determination on September 16, 1996.15 The superior court de-
termined that:
interest should be calculated at [twelve] percent per annum
on the total amount of Merrill's losses from the date of his
injury (when the accident occurred and his cause of action
arose) to the date of the $25,000 Trenn payment, or approxi-
mately forty-one and one-half months. At that point the
Trenn payment would be subtracted from the total damages
and interest would continue to accrue on the difference until
the date of the final settlement, or twelve additional
months16
The defendants petitioned for reconsideration, arguing that
the court was bound to compute interest based on the method put
forth in the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Margadonna
so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the
amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or pro-
portion by which the release pravides that the total claim shall be re-
duced, if greater than the consideration paid.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-7 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
9. See Merrill, 706 A.2d at 1306-07.
10. See id. at 1307.
11. See id. at 1307 n.7.
12. See id. at 1307.
13. See id. (noting that both parties agreed to calculate Merrill's damages at
$66,250).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 1308.
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v. Otis Elevator Co.17 The superior court reversed itself and
adopted a computation method in line with the Margadonna
method.' 8 Merrill appealed this decision to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court asserting that (1) the Margadonna method of com-
puting interest is unfair to the settling party and (2) the court is
violating his equal protection rights by using the Margadonna
method.'
BACKGROUND
In Margadonna, the plaintiff was injured while exiting an ele-
vator owned by Rhode Island Hospital and manufactured by Otis
Elevator Company. 20 The plaintiff sued both parties and eventu-
ally settled with the hospital.21 After trial, a verdict was returned
against Otis.22 Similar to this case, a dispute arose as to how pre-
judgment interest should be calculated.23 The court held that ac-
cording to "[section] 10-6-7 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), the total consideration paid by an ear-
lier-settling joint tortfeasor had to be deducted from the damages
verdict before prejudgment interest could be computed."24 The
Margadonna court adopted this method so that "'the non-settling
tortfeasor is not forced to pay interest on the amount of the
settlement.'"25
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
In Merrill, the court holds that prejudgment interest should be
computed by using the method originally put forth by the superior
court.26 Specifically, since Trenn did not give any release, section
10-6-7 and thereby, the Margadonna method are inapplicable.2 7
To determine a proper method the court looks to the policies under-
lying the prejudgment interest statute, section 9-21-10 of the
17. 542 A.2d 232 (R.I. 1988).
18. See Merrill, 706 A.2d at 1309.
19. See id.
20. Margadonna, 542 A.2d at 232.
21. See id. at 235.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Merrill, 706 A.2d at 1309-10; Margadonna, 542 A.2d at 236.
25. Merrill, 706 A.2d at 1310 (quoting Margadonna, 542 A.2d at 236).
26. See id at 1315.
27. See id. at 1311.
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Rhode Island General Laws. 28 The court holds that the statute
was designed to provide an incentive for early settlements29 and to
"(compensate plaintiffs for waiting for recompense to which they
were legally entitled.'"30 Therefore, the court reasoned that a
method must be devised that "will not impose disincentives on will-
ing litigants to reach as early and as accurate a settlement as the
parties can fashion."31 The court further held that the best method
to achieve these goals is the method previously adopted by the su-
perior court.32 The court reasoned that the superior court's origi-
nal method was the best method since it eliminates the possibility
of the plaintiff receiving "more than full compensation."33
CONCLUSION
The Merrill court holds that the existing Margadonna rule is
only applicable in situations where there are joint-tortfeasor re-
leases. 34 In situations where no releases exist, the superior court's
original method of prejudgment interest is the appropriate
method. 36 Therefore, the court reverses the superior court's inter-
est award and remands the case back to superior court so that the
court may apply its original method of computation. 36
Heather E. Marsden
28. See id. at 1310-11.
29. See DiMeo v. Philbin, 502 A.2d 825, 826 (R.I. 1986).
30. Merrill, 706 A.2d at 1311 (quoting Martin v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
559 A.2d 1028, 1031 (R.I. 1989)).
31, Id. at 1312.
32. See id. at 1312-13.
33. Id. at 1314.
34. Id. at 1315.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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